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ABSTRACT 
 
Many empirical studies have found that interest rate increases have a positive effect on the price 
level. This paper pursues an obvious, but neglected explanation: interest payments are a cost of 
production that is at least in part passed on to customers. A model shows that the cost-push 
effect of inflation, long known as Gibson￿s paradox, intensifies destabilizing forces and can be 
involved in the generation of cycles. An empirical investigation finds that the positive 
association of interest rates with inflation or the log of the price level is present in data from the 
1950s to present. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
A question that has vexed researchers for over 150 years arises in connection with the empirical 
observation known as Gibson￿s paradox. The apparent paradox is that interest rates and the price 
level are positively correlated. In a conventional Keynesian model, a decrease in interest rates 
reduces the rate of economic activity and would presumably therefore put downward pressure 
on inflation rates. Yet a positive correlation between interest rates and prices has been found by 
researchers going back to some of the earliest studies of price data (Tooke 1838).  
A natural explanation for the paradox suggests itself. If interest rates are a cost of 
production and prices are based on costs, then interest rate rises would be passed along to 
consumers in the form of higher prices (Pivetti 2001). In much modern thought, this explanation 
is tied to the notion that interest rates are determined by central bank policy, rather than by 
liquidity preference or equilibrium in the loanable funds market. 
As Taylor (2004) points out, this notion, ￿that the price level (and, by extension, the 
inflation rate) depends positively on the interest rate [,] has a checkered history.￿ Thomas Tooke 
of the 19th century Banking School was perhaps the first to suggest the idea. His point in using 
the concept was to debunk the theories of the Currency School economists, who argued that 
increases in the money supply would cause inflation. A member of the Currency School, like a 
modern monetarist, might expect an increase in the money supply to reduce interest rates, 
stoking economic activity, which would then lead to inflation. Tooke￿s finding that price levels 
were not inversely associated with interest rates casts doubt on this theory.   
As most advocates of the theory of interest rate cost-push inflation have recognized, this 
view has some important potential policy implications. First, high interest rates would be 
exactly the wrong medicine for inflation. It may be that countercyclical interest rate policy does 
affect inflation in the expected direction, by regulating the level of economic activity. But this 
effect would be blunted by a cost-push factor working in the opposite direction. As a result, a 
much steeper recession would be needed to damp inflation than in the absence of the cost-push 
effect.  
If  the cost-push channel of monetary transmission is operative, one might imagine that 
counterinflationary monetary policy would generate instability: a higher inflation level leads the 
authorities to increase interest rates. This has the effect of increasing inflation rather than 
containing it, forcing the authorities to again raise interest rates. If the dynamics of output are  3
linked with those of inflation, then output could be destabilized as well by the use of 
counterinflationary policy. This is a cautionary tale at a time when the Federal Reserve is once 
again considering raising interest rates.  
This paper theoretically examines this possibility. In the following sections, a model is 
developed along the lines suggested by many Keynesian, Sraffian, and Kaleckian scholars. First, 
prices are determined by costs, plus a markup determined by monetary policy. When prices rise 
above cost plus the markup, they tend to be driven down by competition.  Interest rates are 
determined by the central bank. In this case, the central bank is assumed to target inflation. 
Turning to the dynamics of output, a Minskyan effect of interest rates on output is posited 
(Minsky 1986, esp. Ch. 9; Hannsgen, forthcoming). Firms and individuals tend to ￿lend long 
and borrow short.￿ That is, they finance their activities with short-term loans obtained at an 
interest rate determined by the central bank. Much of their funds are tied up in long-term, fixed￿
interest rate government bonds, however. When the cost of short-term funds rises, the gap 
between the earnings of banks and their interest payments shrinks, causing a worsening of 
banks￿ financial condition and weakening the incentive to invest. Similarly, the existing level of 
output has an effect on the incentive to invest.  
The results confirm the suggestion above that in this scenario, aggressive monetary 
policy can have a destabilizing effect. When the sensitivity of policy to inflation is high, the 
equilibrium point becomes unstable. In any event a limit cycle can exist: in inflation-output 
space there is a closed cyclical path outside of the equilibrium point. The economy is attracted 
to that cycle from anywhere else except the equilibrium point. A number of factors lead to this 
form of instability, among them the Gibson effect. So, the Gibson paradox can cause an 
economy that would otherwise tend to gravitate toward equilibrium to move into a cyclical path. 
Alternatively, a ￿corridor of stability￿ exists, within which the economy tends to move toward 
the center. This zone of stability shrinks as the flexibility of prices changes, increasing the 
difficulty of the task of keeping the economy within limits. 
An empirical investigation follows the model. The empirical section finds that interest 
rates and inflation or the price level are positively associated according to various measures. The 
existence and strength of the relationship depend upon the means used to deal with the trends in 
both variables. In addition to the problem of trends in the data, one encounters problems with 
alternative explanations of the posited relationship: interest rate increases may appear to ￿cause￿  4
inflation when they are in fact a reaction to it. These problems call for further study using more 
sophisticated multivariable techniques.  
 
2. THE MODEL 
 
We begin by positing a cost-driven price determination mechanism. It is assumed that there are 
two factors of production: labor and bank loans. The production technology dictates that firms 
must hire ￿a￿ units of labor for each unit of output they want to produce. Moreover, output takes 
one period, so that entrepreneurs must pay one period￿s interest on their labor costs. 
Alternatively, firms are run by rentiers who earn a rate of profit equal to the interest rate. In this 
case, the profit rate is determined by monetary policy (Sraffa 1960; Pivetti 2001). Capitalists 
will not produce if they can earn a better return on the bond market. Mathematically, these 




Here and in subsequent equations, capital letters indicate variable names. Small letters 
are positive parameters or function names. Periods indicate multiplication. W is the hourly 
wage, a is the (fixed) labor/output ratio, R is the interest rate, and C is the cost of production of 
one unit of output. Note that the term cost is used here in a broad sense to include a normal rate 
of profit.  
Using the approximation that the logarithm of (1+R) is roughly R for small R, the 
equation for the logarithm C is 
 
Ln(C) ≈ R + ln(a) + ln(W)        (1) 
 
where the function ln indicates the natural logarithm. The entry and exit of entrepreneurs forces 
the retail price to adjust toward costs (including the income of rentiers).  
 
П = b.(ln(C) - ln(P))     (2) 
  5
where П is inflation ((dP/dt)/P) and P is the price level. Substituting (1) into (2) and 
differentiating by time, one gets 
 
dП/dt = b.((dR/dt) + (dW/dt)/W ￿ П)     (3) 
 
where the approximation is replaced by an equals sign for convenience. To flesh out the details 
of this equation, one assumes the following. Interest rates are adjusted by the central bank 
according to its preferences regarding inflation and output levels. 
 
dR/dt = c(П-Π*,Y)      (4) 
 
where Y equals output and cΠ, cY>0, using subscripts to indicate partial derivatives. The central 
bank raises interest rates when output and inflation are high, and lowers rates in the opposite 
case. This equation is a very general form of a Taylor rule. It is consistent with the assumption 
of an endogenous money supply and an exogenous interest rate (Moore 1988). 
 
The wage growth equation is 
 
(dW/dt)/W = d(П, Y)     (5) 
 
d П >0 , dY > 0. Wages are driven by the power of labor, which is positively affected by a 
vigorous economy (high Y). (Labor becomes more aggressive in its wage demands when it is 
easier to find a job. A tight labor market is associated with a high Y because of the fixed 
technical coefficients assumption.) Also, labor manages to recover some of what is lost to 
inflation, as indicated by the first argument of the function d. This term can be taken to reflect 
some form of wage indexation. Note that we do not explicitly model price expectations and 
assume a direct reaction to actual inflation. Thus, employers do not pay lower wages when 
workers are ￿fooled￿ by higher than expected price increases. 
 
Plugging (4) and (5) into (3), 
 
dП/dt = b.(c(П-Π*, Y) + d(П, Y) - П)       (6)  6
Turning to the real side of the model, growth is negatively affected by the rate of change 
of the interest rate and positively affected by the existing level of output. (Note the contrast with 
standard theories that relate output to the level of the interest rate.) The former effect has been 
justified above by the fact that entrepreneurs or banks have ￿short positions, ￿ following Minsky 
(1986) and Hannsgen (forthcoming). (Entrepreneurs or banks borrow in short-term markets, 
such as the commercial paper market, and invest in longer-term projects.)  
History offers quite a few examples of this phenomenon. Perhaps one of the most 
extreme cases is the savings-and-loan crisis of the late 1970s and early 1980s. As Federal 
Reserve Board Chairman Paul Volcker raised interest rates, savings and loans found themselves 
losing deposits to instruments with a greater return than deposits. Eventually, savings and loan 
institutions were able to raise their deposit rates in an effort to retain funds. But, the assets of 
savings and loan associations were mainly fixed-rate, long-term mortgages. Thus, even as 
savings and loans paid more for deposits, their income remained largely unchanged. The 
resulting squeeze was one factor that ultimately led to the loss of all positive net worth of the 
industry. 
The second term in the output equation, the relationship between output and its own 
derivative, is based upon the idea that the optimism or ￿animal spirits￿ of capitalists is favorably 
affected by high sales. The notion that capacity utilization affects investment can be traced to 
Steindl (1976) and the importance of cash flow to investment finds supporters among new 
Keynesians who emphasize capital market imperfections. Putting these ideas together, one gets 
 
dY/dt = e(dR/dt, Y) = e(c(П-Π*, Y), Y)     (7) 
 
In accordance with the argument of the previous paragraphs, edR/dt<0; eY>0 
 











bc d bc d
ec ec e
YY














   (8) 
  7
This matrix is evaluated at the equilibrium values of the variables, which are assumed to be 
positive. Based on the assumptions above about the signs of various partial derivatives, the sign 














First, a very general description of the dynamic analysis is in order. For the moment, let 
us assume that δ is positive, while α is negative. Also, assume that the χ and β are large in 
absolute value. Under these assumptions, the model fits into a well-known ￿genus￿ of cycles, 
which has recently been explored by Taylor (2004). The product of the roots is equal to the 
determinant, which is positive under the assumptions. The sum of the roots is equal to the trace 
of the matrix (the sum of the terms on the principal diagonal), which will depend on the relative 
strengths of α and δ. If the positive δ is smaller than the negative α in absolute value, the trace is 
negative and the sum of the roots is negative, indicating two roots with negative real part. The 
system is then either a stable focus or a stable node, depending upon whether the roots are 
complex or real. If the trace is positive on the other hand, the two roots have positive real part, 
and the system is unstable. 
As one would expect from this discussion, the proof of the system￿s dynamics depends 
on the trace and determinant of J.  The gist of the proposition beginning in the next paragraph is 
that the system displays local stability for certain values of b. However, there is some critical 
value of b, the parameter of the price adjustment parameter, designated b*, such that the system 
loses local stability when b > b*, or b < b*.   
In addition, one of two types of cycles is involved. The first type is a stable limit cycle, 
depicted in figure 1. (Figures 1￿6 are at the back.) This cycle is approached from inside by 
outward spirals and from outside by inward spirals. The cycle emerges, if at all, for only b < b* 
or only b > b*. The figures show the case where instability arises for b > b*. For b < b*, paths 
around the equilibrium spiral toward the center, as seen in figure 2.  
The second type of possible cycle is an unstable one and is shown in figure 3. Paths 
beginning inside the cycle spiral inward toward the fixed point, rather than outward. Paths 
beginning outside the cycle move ever outward, instead of approaching the cycle. This sort of 
cycle exists, either when b > b* or when b< b*; in the diagram, the latter is assumed. When this  8
form of unstable cycle exists, the case b > b* is an unstable focus, from which all paths spiral 
outward. See figure 4. Unfortunately, there is no way of determining which sort of cycle exists 
in the model described here. (It depends upon the second and third derivatives of the system, 
which mostly have no economic interpretation.) 
 
The formalities are as follows and can be skipped: 
 
Proposition:  Let b* = b1/b2 = (-edR/dt . cY -- eY)/(cΠ + dΠ ￿ 1), where all derivatives are evaluated 
at the point (Π
e, Y
e), the fixed point of the system. Suppose b* > 0. Also, suppose (dΠ ￿1).(cY + 
eY/edR/dt) < cΠ.(dY - eY/edR/dt) at (Π
e, Y
e). Then, the system is asymptotically locally stable for b < 
b* if b1 > 0 and for b > b* if b1 < 0. As b reaches the value b* from below (b1 > 0) or above (b1 
< 0), it loses its stability, either through the birth of a stable limit cycle or the death of an 
unstable limit cycle. (This is known as a Hopf bifurcation; see Gandolfo 1997, p. 475￿80.) 
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Keeping in mind that the initial derivative in the last equality is negative, the second assumption 
clearly guarantees that the determinant is positive at the relevant point. The first condition 
requires that there exists a value of the parameter b, designated b*, with b* > 0, such that the 
trace switches from negative to positive as b passes through b*. The sum of the roots therefore 
also switches from negative to positive. Therefore stability is lost or gained at that point. It is  9
also a well-known exercise to prove the existence of a limit cycle when the trace and 
determinant are configured as they are here (since the roots are purely imaginary at b*).  
 
What is the economic meaning of the dynamics? The stability of the system depends 
upon the flexibility of inflation, given by the parameter b. Depending upon the values of various 
derivatives at the equilibrium of the system, there may be a value of b above which or below 
which the system loses or gains stability; if that is the case, some form of cycle may exist. The 
existence and amplitude of this cycle will depend either positively or negatively upon the 
flexibility of inflation, given by b. In some cases, flexible adjustment of inflation to cost 
changes reduces the stability of the system, while rapid adjustment can in other circumstances 
be associated with instability.  
Another implication can be seen from the trace of the matrix in equation 6. The system 
loses stability when the trace becomes positive. The derivative of the policy function with 
respect to inflation, cΠ, is one of the terms in the trace and so contributes to the possible 
generation of instability. This term represents the sensitivity of the central bank￿s reaction to 
deviations of inflation from its target. So, highly responsive policy has a destabilizing effect for 
some values of the parameters of the system.  
The relationship of dynamics of the system to the parameter b are shown in figure 5. 
Along one axis is b, the parameter of interest. As one moves along that axis, price flexibility 
changes.  The two state variables of the system (Y and Π) are on the other two axes. A 
horizontal ￿slice￿ of figure 3 at a particular value of b (such as figures 1 and 2) shows the 
dynamics for a particular degree of flexibility. At low values of b, paths are shown spiraling 
inward toward a central equilibrium on the dashed vertical line. If b > b*, the slice contains a 
cross section of the ￿bowl￿ that broadens as b increases. The outer border of the cross-section is 
similar in shape to an ellipse. This is the path that the economy will approach from anywhere 
else in the cross-section. 
As stated earlier, the existence of this particular set of dynamics depends upon certain 
technical conditions, one of which (the transversality condition) is always satisfied. The second 
condition involves the third-order derivatives of the system and does not have any economic 
meaning. But there is only one other possible set of dynamic paths that is possible if the second 
technical condition is not met. This alternative also involves a limit cycle, but in this case the 
limit cycle is unstable and the equilibrium point at the center is stable. So, any path inside the  10
limit cycle will lead inward to the central equilibrium. Any point outside the limit cycle will 
move continually outward.  So there is a ￿corridor of stability.￿ The corridor is larger for small 
values of b. So, if b is large, the economy is less able to regain its equilibrium after a shock than 
if b is small. 
This is shown in figure 6. Suppose the economy is originally at the equilibrium point C 
at the center of the figure. Then the economy receives some sort of shock that pushes it out to D. 
As figure shows, the economy eventually moves back to the equilibrium point, as shown. But 
when b is larger, as seen in figure 6, the corridor of stability is smaller or even dimensionless. If 
the economy starts at A and is then shocked to point B, it does not readjust back to equilibrium, 
instead spiraling endlessly outward. Notice that this is for a shock equal in size to the one 
considered earlier. Hence, large b makes it difficult for the economy to recover from large 
shocks.  
Thus, we have two cases. In each case, high (or low) values of b lead to a greater degree 
of instability. In the first case, shown in figures 1 and 2, high (or low) values of b turn a stable 
point into a stable cycle. In the second case, shown in figures 3 and 4, the stable basin shrinks as 
b rises (falls). It is partly because of the ￿cost-push￿ effect of interest rates that one comes to this 
policy conclusion, though other terms are clearly involved in the stability condition. The cost-
push phenomenon also lies behind the paradoxical conclusion that aggressive monetary policy 
can destabilize output and inflation.  
 
3. EMPIRICS OF GIBSON￿S PARADOX 
 
Because Gibson￿s paradox has been observed over such a long period, it has found its way into 
a number of strands of empirical literature. In this section, the author looks at the issue using 
some rather crude techniques. A future paper will investigate the problem using multivariable 
methods.  
The data used are for the federal funds rate and the consumer price index (CPI) for all 
urban consumers. Because the effects involved are presumed to operate over a fairly long term, 
the monthly data were averaged over three months to create quarterly data. The federal funds 
rate is perhaps the most logical rate to use, since it is the most directly controlled by 
policymakers. All available data (1954￿2004) were used.  11
One problem with this exercise is that the data contain trends. Indeed, both the log of the 
CPI and the federal funds rate contain unit roots, according to standard Dickey-Fuller  (DF) and 
Phillips-Perron tests.
1 This observation suggests the idea of differencing the data. On 
differencing the log CPI data, one gets a measure of inflation. The following scatter plot and 
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Dependent Variable: Percentage change CPI-au, S.A. (quarterly average) 
R-squared: .523 
F-stat: 214.79 (.000) 
      C o e f f i c i e n t     T - r a t i o  
Regressor:  Intercept     -.017     -.053 
FFR  (quarterly  average)    .693     14.656 
 
The relationship works in the expected direction, but less than seven-tenths of each percentage 
point increase in interest rates cost are passed on as inflation. Note that, even with only one 
explanatory variable, the R-squared exceeds one-half. The Durbin-Watson statistic in this and 
                                                 
1 For the log of the CPI, the AIC, SBC, and HQC specification tests suggested a DF test augmented with 
four lags of the differenced variable. The DF test statistic for this specification was approximately ￿2.23, well short 
of the cutoff of ￿2.88, preventing the rejection of the null of no unit root. This finding was robust to the inclusion of 
time trend. The Phillips-Perron test, based on a window of 4 lags, yielded a test statistic of 1.25, which also fell 
short of the level needed to reject a unit root in log CPI.  
For the federal funds rate, no order of ADF test up to 12 rejected the unit root null. For example, a four-lag ADF 
had a test statistic of ￿2.09, as compared with the 2.88 critical value. The Phillips-Perron statistic, which had the 
same critical value, was -.48611.  12
the other traditional regressions reported here suggests a high degree of autocorrelation, so 
hypothesis tests should be interpreted with caution.  
 
Alternatively, one can assume a deterministic trend. In the next equation, the log CPI variable 
was regressed against a constant and a deterministic trend. Then, the residuals (detrended prices) 
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Dependent Variable: Detrended Log CPI-au-S.A. (quarterly average) 
R-squared: .079 
F-stat: 16.72 (.000) 
      C o e f f i c i e n t     T - r a t i o  
Regressor:  Intercept     -.058     -3.552 
FFR  (quarterly  average)    .010     4.089 
 
In this case, a one-percentage-point increase in the federal funds rate leads to almost exactly a 
one-percentage point increase in the price index. On the other hand, the R-squared is very low, 
represented in the scatter plot by the wide spread of the observed values for a given level of the 
independent variable. This broad range of the data is expected, given that interest rates are only 
one component of firms￿ costs.  13
An effort was made to regress the detrended price data on the differenced federal funds 
rate series. The resulting coefficicent was positive and highly significant, but the R-squared was 
minute. Although the interest rate data are integrated according to standard tests, they do not 
exactly fit the description of a nonstationary variable, as they cannot in principle wander without 
bound. Therefore, a regression involving differenced variables may not be the right approach, 
anyway. In a yet another regression, following the approach of Kydland and Prescott (1990), 
both the interest rate and price series were detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. The 
correlation between the variables, detrended in this way, was .66. 
There are two reasons why it might be preferable to use a bivariate autoregression to 
analyze these results. First, it is clear that lagged values of the variables may be important in this 
relationship. Second, there is an identification problem: interest rate hikes may be passed along 
as price increases, and the Fed may respond to price increases (actual or prospective) by 
increasing the federal funds rate.  
In the literature on this issue, which is immense, neoclassical economists have arrived at 
the solution of using a vector autoregression that includes a commodity price index. The idea is 
that the central bank raises interest rates when it expects inflation, creating a spurious 
impression that interest rates drive price increases. The index involved essentially controls for 
Federal Reserve inflation expectations and averts the result that interest rate shocks have a 
positive effect on the CPI (Sims 1992). A recent paper has called this interpretation into 
question by showing that the indices in question are not particularly good predictors of inflation, 
and that other, more accurate, predictors of inflation do not ￿correct￿ the apparently anomalous 
finding (Hanson forthcoming). Putting to one side issues connected with multivariable 
techniques, this paper next investigates the bivariate relationships involved. 
The Akaike and Schwarz-Bayesian specification criteria both selected a 4-lag 
specification for the bivariate autoregression. The following were the results. 
 
Vector autoregression. Variables: Federal funds rate, quarterly average; detrended log CPI-au-
S.A., quarterly average; constant term. 1955￿2004. Four lags of each variable included. 
R-squared: .999 
F-stat: 27400 (.000) 
       
Null:       F-statistic    Prob.  14
FFR does not Granger-cause CPI  (4, 185) 9.562       .000 
CPI does not Granger-cause FFR  (4, 185) 2.868       .025     
 
The meaning of Granger causality tests has been questioned by many econometricians. Some 
argue that the tests merely determine whether one variable ￿precedes,￿ rather than causes 
another and suffer from a post-hoc-ergo-propter-hoc fallacy (Leamer 1985). Bearing these 
critiques in mind, one can draw the conclusion that if precedence implies causation, the 
evidence more strongly supports the notion that the interest rate causes the price level than vice-
versa. On the other hand, lagged values of both variables are important in this system.  
A more direct way of measuring the potential inflationary effect of interest rate increases 
is to find the ratio of business￿s interest costs to the value of their final sales. A conservative 
way of measuring interest costs is to add up the total value of outstanding business loans, 
commercial paper, and ￿other loans and advances.￿ This sum excludes mortgages, consumer 
loans, and longer-term debt, such as corporate bonds. The total in question is approximately 
$2.1 trillion (Federal Reserve Board 2004). A one-percentage-point rise in interest rates 
(ignoring compounding) would then impose a cost on businesses of $20 billion, or .27 percent 
of the value of private-sector output. A more comprehensive measure of business debt, which 
includes both long- and short-term borrowing, is the total nonfinancial business credit market 
debt, which is approximately $7.4 trillion. A one-percentage-point rise in interest costs would 
then amount to a ￿tax￿ on business of $74 billion, or approximately one percent of private-
sector output. Of course this number is an upper bound, because Federal Reserve policy has 
little immediate effect on the debt service costs associated with long-term debt.  
The empirical exercises of this section show that there are many reasons to believe that 
the Gibson effect is operative. Because of the difficult issues associated with detrending, it is 
difficult to measure this effect or find a single conclusive test of its existence.  
The implications of the empirical findings are that one must be aware of possible 
perverse effects in implementing monetary policy. Significantly, in the presence of the Gibson 
effect, one model shows that cycles develop, and that theses cycles become more severe as price 
flexibility changes. A complicated set of effects is involved, but the key causal chain is that an 
increase in inflation increases the central bank￿s tendency to raise rates, which only exacerbates 
the original inflationary problem. This latter chain of events can clearly generate instability, 
whether or not cycles are involved. Other factors leading to cyclical behavior are the dynamics  15
of wage formation and positive feedback between output and its rate of increase. It is clear that 
Gibson￿s paradox, along with Minskyan ideas about the real effects of monetary policy and 
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